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Thinking of Biology
I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to 
the swift, nor the battle to the strong...but time and chance
happeneth to them all.
—Ecclesiastes 9:11
Chance is a word devoid of sense; nothing can exist 
without a cause.
—Voltaire
In the early decades of the 20th century, physics un-derwent a dramatic revolution in which the classical, de-
terministic worldview associated with Newtonianism gave way
to a conception of the world transformed by discoveries in
quantum mechanics. According to this conception, proba-
bilities do not simply reflect our limitations as cognitive
agents; they reflect the fundamental physical structure of the
world. Despite insistence by some scientists that quantum phe-
nomena must be deterministic after all (memorably ex-
pressed in Einstein’s assertion that “God does not play dice”),
physics shows no signs of returning to a deterministic con-
ception of the world.
According to some thinkers, evolution is also fundamen-
tally indeterministic. They argue that, in addition to any in-
determinism introduced by quantum events, at least some 
evolutionary processes are themselves fundamentally inde-
terministic. If true, this would represent a revolution in our
understanding of evolution on a par with the revolution that
shook physics a century ago.
Claims of imminent scientific revolution are a dime a
dozen. Bona fide scientific revolutions, however, are hard to
come by. Is there reason to conclude that we are on the brink
of such a momentous event? Not everyone has been 
persuaded.A number of philosophers have argued that claims
for evolutionary indeterminism are premature at best and
deeply confused at worst. They maintain that evolutionary
processes can and should be understood as deterministic
processes. Evolutionary indeterminists, of course, disagree. The
controversy continues unabated and is now one of the liveli-
est topics in the philosophy of biology.
The moment is opportune for an overview of this debate,
both for its intrinsic interest and because a number of far-
reaching issues are at stake. Although at one level the debate
between evolutionary indeterminists and evolutionary de-
terminists is a local disagreement about the nature of evolu-
tionary processes, at a deeper level it concerns both the pur-
pose of scientific theories and the fundamental relationship
between biology and the physical sciences.Arguments for evo-
lutionary indeterminism typically presuppose that, both
methodologically and conceptually, biology enjoys consid-
erable autonomy from the physical sciences. Arguments for
evolutionary determinism, on the other hand, take con-
silience within and among the findings of various branches
of science as a fundamental  value for an integrated scientific
conception of the universe. The issues raised in the debate over
evolutionary indeterminism thus go to the heart of our un-
derstanding both of science as an explanatory enterprise and
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of the world it seeks to explain. To clarify these issues, the ar-
guments for and against evolutionary indeterminism must be
examined with some care. First, however, it is essential to un-
derstand the terms of the debate and to be as clear as possible
about what the debate over evolutionary indeterminism is, and
is not, about.
Evolutionary indeterminism
Although it will require some unpacking, the claim advanced
by evolutionary indeterminists can be stated quite simply.
The evolutionary indeterminism thesis: The probabilistic
concepts that appear in evolutionary theory represent gen-
uine indeterminacies in evolutionary processes themselves,
rather than being required simply because of our cognitive
limitations. Evolutionary processes contain indeterministic
elements in addition to any indeterminism resulting from
events at the subatomic level.
Evolutionary determinists reject this claim and defend its
contrary.
The evolutionary determinism thesis: The probabilistic
concepts that appear in evolutionary theory are required
because of our cognitive limitations, but they do not repre-
sent genuine indeterminacies in the evolutionary processes
themselves. Evolutionary processes contain no indetermin-
istic elements other than those resulting from indetermin-
ism among events at the subatomic level.
Both theses concern the relationship between evolutionary the-
ory and evolutionary processes. Evolutionary processes are
those biological processes that bring about intergenerational
changes in the genotypic or phenotypic composition of a bi-
ological population (i.e., Darwin’s “descent with modifica-
tion”).According to the neo-Darwinian account of evolution,
such changes are brought about by the interaction of various
evolutionary causes, among them selection, drift, mutation,
and inbreeding. Evolutionary theory, on the other hand, is the
collection of models, principles, generalizations, and sub-
theories proposed to explain evolutionary change. Examples
would be Wright’s shifting balance theory, Fisher’s funda-
mental theorem of natural selection, Eldredge and Gould’s the-
ory of punctuated equilibria, and the thermoregulatory the-
ory of the origin of feathers. Evolutionary theory is the
collection of abstract human constructions intended to ac-
count for the concrete facts of the evolutionary process as they
are accessible to us through observation and experiment.
Further distinctions are necessary to clarify the terms of the
debate. Theories are either probabilistic or classical (non-
probabilistic). Probabilistic theories make use of probabilis-
tic concepts. For example, statistical thermodynamics is a
probabilistic theory because (among other things) it makes
use of the probabilistic concept of entropy in describing how
energy is likely to be distributed in a closed system. Classical
theories make no use of probabilistic concepts. Newtonian
physics, for example, treats the motion of any object as fully
describable in terms of the various forces acting upon it;
probabilities play no role whatsoever. Whether or not a 
theory is probabilistic depends entirely on whether it employs
probabilistic concepts.
Processes, on the other hand, are deterministic or inde-
terministic. A process is deterministic if the events that make
up the process are the necessary consequences of antecedent,
sufficient causes. To take the classic example, one billiard
ball hitting another billiard ball would be a deterministic
process if the collision of the first ball with the second was suf-
ficient (in those conditions) to cause the second ball to move.
A process is indeterministic if the events that make up the
process are not the necessary consequences of antecedent, suf-
ficient causes. According to a widely held interpretation of
quantum mechanics, some subatomic processes are not the
necessary result of events that preceded them. For example,
whereas physicists can assign a probability to the emission of
a particular particle from a substance undergoing radioactive
decay, they cannot, even in principle, identify a set of suffi-
cient causes for the emission of that particle. Their inability
to do so is not a result of cognitive limitations. Instead, it re-
flects a fundamental fact about the nature of physical reality.
The distinctions between classical and probabilistic theo-
ries, on the one hand, and between deterministic and inde-
terministic processes, on the other, are orthogonal to one
another. Newtonian dynamics is thus a classical theory of de-
terministic processes. Statistical thermodynamics is a prob-
abilistic theory of deterministic processes. Quantum me-
chanics is (in part) a probabilistic theory of indeterministic
processes. Classical theories of indeterministic processes are,
perhaps not surprisingly, conspicuous by their absence.
These distinctions are essential for understanding the de-
bate over evolutionary indeterminism. All participants in
the debate agree that evolutionary theory as it currently ex-
ists, and is likely to exist in the future, makes use of probabilistic
concepts such as fitness and drift, and hence that evolution-
ary theory is a probabilistic theory. But they part company in
their explanations of the sources of the probabilities that fig-
ure in evolutionary theory. According to evolutionary inde-
terminists, probabilistic concepts figure in evolutionary the-
ory because they represent objectively indeterministic
processes in nature and are thus necessarily ineliminable
from evolutionary theory. In this respect, evolutionary inde-
terminists see evolutionary theory as akin to quantum me-
chanics. According to evolutionary determinists, on the other
hand, evolutionary processes per se are fully deterministic, and
evolutionary theory employs probabilistic concepts only be-
cause we cannot know every microevent transpiring in the
course of evolution. They hold that this simply reflects our lim-
itations as cognitive agents; in principle (although not in
practice), probabilistic concepts are eliminable from evolu-
tionary theory. Thus, evolutionary determinists see evolu-
tionary theory as a scientific theory akin to statistical thermo-
dynamics.
Quantum indeterminism and evolutionary processes
Perhaps surprisingly, evolutionary indeterminists and evo-
lutionary determinists agree that there is an element of
February 2003 / Vol. 53 No. 2 •  BioScience 165
indeterminism in the fundamental structure of physical re-
ality as described by quantum mechanics and that indeter-
minism at this fundamental level can have effects in biolog-
ical systems. This point of agreement is encapsulated in the
percolation argument.
The percolation argument: Indeterminism in the most
fundamental physical processes, as described by quantum
mechanics, can “percolate up” into (i.e., have effects in)
macrolevel physical systems. Biological systems are
macrolevel physical systems. Therefore, indeterminism in
the most fundamental physical processes can have effects
in biological systems.
As Bruce Glymour (2001) notes, “There is reason to believe
that it is not only possible for [biological] mechanisms to
translate quantum indeterminacy into stochastic behavior at
macro levels, but also that such mechanisms exist” (p. 527).
Others have gone further to explore in detail how this might
happen (Stamos 2001). Yet none of this has the slightest
bearing on the issue of evolutionary indeterminism, which
maintains that there are sources of indeterminism in evolu-
tion over and above any indeterminism resulting from quan-
tum mechanical factors. The question is whether there are dis-
tinctive forms of evolutionary indeterminism in addition to
the indeterminism contributed by events at the subatomic
level. Evolutionary indeterminists claim that there are; evo-
lutionary determinists deny this. But more clarification is
needed.
Reducible versus irreducible indeterminism. To get at this crit-
ical issue, we can deploy a further distinction between two dif-
ferent kinds of indeterminism. Indeterminism at the sub-
atomic level is what might be called “irreducible”
indeterminism, meaning that the indeterminism in ques-
tion is fundamental at that level and cannot be explained in
terms of indeterminism at some lower level of events. On the
other hand, any indeterminism that occurs at the macro level
as a result of indeterminacies at the quantum level is re-
ducible indeterminism; it is indeterminism that is not fun-
damental to the macrolevel but rather has percolated up to
that level from some lower level where it is fundamental. In-
determinism at the macro level that results from indeter-
minism at the quantum level is derivative, not fundamental,
because its explanation is to be found in events at a lower level
of organization. Reducible indeterminism has its ultimate ex-
planation in indeterminism at some lower level. Irreducible
indeterminism, by contrast, cannot be explained further in
terms of indeterminism at some lower level. But how does this
distinction help to clarify the debate over evolutionary inde-
terminism?
Reducible versus irreducible evolutionary indeterminism.
Evolutionary indeterminists and evolutionary determinists
agree that evolutionary processes contain reducibly indeter-
ministic elements, thanks to quantum-level indeterminism.
But because the indeterminism in question has its origin in
the subatomic realm, there is nothing distinctively evolu-
tionary about it. The debate between evolutionary indeter-
minists and evolutionary determinists turns on whether there
is irreducible evolutionary indeterminism: that is, sources
of indeterminism in evolutionary processes that arise from
the nature of those very processes and cannot be attributed
to indeterminism percolating up from the quantum level. Evo-
lutionary indeterminists argue that irreducible evolutionary
indeterminism is real, whereas evolutionary determinists
deny this. This, then, is the point on which the entire debate
turns. What sorts of arguments can each side marshal in de-
fense of its claims?
Arguments for irreducible 
evolutionary indeterminism
Evolutionary indeterminists offer four arguments in sup-
port of irreducible evolutionary indeterminism. Each is 
examined below, along with responses by evolutionary 
determinists.
The fitness argument. According to standard presentations
of evolutionary theory, natural selection is a sampling process
operating on heritable variation in fitness among individu-
als at some level of the biological hierarchy. That is, natural
selection is the process that sorts biological entities on the ba-
sis of differences in their fitness. Those biological entities
with greater fitness will tend to enjoy greater biological suc-
cess (survival, reproduction, or both) than those entities with
less fitness. There is, of course, no guarantee that greater fit-
ness will always translate directly into greater biological suc-
cess. Although fitter organisms will, on average, tend to be
more biologically successful, events can always interfere with
this outcome. Hence,“fitness”can be interpreted as a propen-
sity to survive and produce viable offspring (Mills and Beatty
1979). According to a widely accepted view, selection oper-
ates directly on such propensities.
Evolutionary indeterminists accept the interpretation of fit-
ness as a propensity, noting that at best there is a probabilis-
tic relationship between fitness and actual biological suc-
cess. If so, then fitness as a propensity for biological success
constitutes a genuinely probabilistic property of biological en-
tities and hence warrants the claim for irreducible evolu-
tionary indeterminism.
Evolutionary determinists reject this argument. The prob-
lem lies not with the propensity interpretation of fitness per
se, which they can readily accept, but rather with the unex-
amined assumption that selection operates directly on fitness
differences—an assumption that, on closer analysis, turns
out to be false. Selection operates on phenotypic differences,
but these phenotypic differences need not represent fitness dif-
ferences (Shanahan 1990).
To make clear the causal structure of selection events, evo-
lutionary determinists may simply describe selection events
as follows:
Phenotypic traits → deterministically cause → biological success
(in a specified environment)
Thinking of Biology
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Notice that the concept of “fitness” nowhere appears in this
causal chain. Fitness as a propensity for biological success is
not a property that causally interacts with the environment.
To see this, consider the following two hypothetical organisms
and their properties. (Numbers represent arbitrary values of
fitness components—that is, specific properties—which to-
gether determine overall fitness.)
Although these two organisms differ in their phenotypic
properties, they have identical overall fitness.According to the
propensity interpretation of fitness, therefore, they have equal
probabilities of biological success when situated in the envi-
ronment in relation to which their fitness values are deter-
mined. However, despite their identical overall fitness, in any
specific interaction with the environment only a small sub-
set of their phenotypic properties, rather than fitness per se,
determines how biologically successful the organism actually
is. For example, if a disease epidemic broke out, killing or-
ganism B (with low resistance) but sparing organism A (with
high resistance), this would be an example of natural selec-
tion, despite the absence of overall fitness differences be-
tween the two organisms.
It might be tempting to respond that although overall fit-
ness differences play no causal role in differential biological
success, various components of overall fitness nonetheless do.
In the example above, the two organisms differed in their com-
ponents of fitness. In an environment that includes a disease
epidemic, perhaps it was the fitness difference in one of the
components (i.e., disease resistance) that resulted in their
differential biological success. But even here, what directly de-
termines an organism’s fate is not its propensity for surviv-
ing disease but rather the specific way in which its properties
in fact interact with those of the environment, resulting in its
survival (Shanahan 1989, 1992).
To see this, consider an analogy. For any (fair) coin, we may
say that when flipped it has a propensity for coming up heads
50 percent of the time. Suppose that we flip the coin and it
comes up heads. If we now ask why it came up heads on this
particular toss, it is clear that appealing to its propensity for
coming up heads roughly half of the time provides an ex-
planation of sorts, but there is a deeper explanation available
in which propensities play no part whatsoever. The factors that
caused this particular coin to come up heads on this partic-
ular toss were its initial position on the back of the flipper’s
thumb, the amount of force applied, the number of turns in
the air, the elasticity of the surface it landed on, and the like.
Knowing that it is a fair coin and thus has a certain propen-
sity may help us to predict how a series of tosses is likely to
turn out. But if we flip the coin a number of times, and it
comes up heads a certain number of times, it is still not the
case that its propensity for coming up heads was the cause of
this outcome. This outcome came about because of the par-
ticular factors operative in each toss of the coin. The total num-
ber of times the coin comes up heads is simply a product of
these individual factors. The coin’s propensity per se plays no
causal role whatsoever.
To bring the discussion back to biology, fitness as a propen-
sity for biological success is not a property of an organism that
causally interacts with the environment, and thus it plays no
causal role in the process of evolution itself. As Elliott Sober
(1984) notes, fitness is “causally inert.” If so, then an appeal
to the propensity interpretation of fitness cannot warrant a
claim for evolutionary indeterminism.
Why, then, does the concept of fitness play such an im-
portant role in evolutionary theory? For the evolutionary
determinist, the answer is straightforward: The concept of fit-
ness allows us to make useful generalizations and predic-
tions. Dark-colored moths in a predominantly dark (e.g.,
soot-covered) environment are more likely than their lighter
conspecifics to enjoy greater biological success in that envi-
ronment. Hence we are justified in claiming that the dark-
colored moths have greater fitness, and we might accordingly
expect the relative proportion of dark- to light-colored moths
to increase in the course of several generations. One can say
that a given organism was more biologically successful than
another because of the former’s superior fitness, but this is just
a shorthand description that leaves open the question of why
this organism fared better than its conspecifics.As Sterelny and
Kitcher (1988) note, “In principle, we could relate the biog-
raphy of each organism in the population, explaining in full
detail how it developed, reproduced, and survived, just as we
could track the motion of each molecule of a sample of gas.
But evolutionary theory, like statistical mechanics, has no
use for such a fine grain of description: the aim is to make clear
the central tendencies in the history of evolving populations”
(p. 345).
There is no doubt that probabilistic concepts like fitness play
an essential role in evolutionary explanations (Ariew 1998).
But the considerable utility of the concept of fitness in evo-
lutionary theory provides no reason to conclude that the
process of natural selection involves any irreducibly indeter-
ministic element (Graves et al. 1999, Rosenberg 1988, 2001).
The drift argument. A second argument for evolutionary
indeterminism focuses on the concept of drift. According to
the standard account, “drift” describes a process in which
evolutionary change is the result of sampling error. It can oc-
cur in several ways (Beatty 1984). First, among sexual or-
ganisms a kind of lottery takes place in which some genes do,
and some do not, find their way into gametes and hence
have the possibility of being transmitted to the next genera-
tion. If there is no strong selection for or against the genes in
question, gene frequencies can drift in a direction unrelated
to selection pressures. Despite the lack of selective advantage
Organism A Organism B
Disease resistance 8 3
Visual acuity 7 5
Protective coloration 5 4
Fleetness 4 6
Social status 2 8
Overall fitness (total) 26 26
February 2003 / Vol. 53 No. 2 •  BioScience 167
of a trait in a population, that trait might still increase in the
population from one generation to the next just because
more of the individuals possessing that trait happened by
chance to survive and reproduce than did those lacking the
trait. Because such changes are random with respect to fitness
differences among individuals, they cannot be predicted from
a knowledge of fitness differences. At best, we can assign
probabilities to estimates of the relative frequencies of such
traits in future generations. According to evolutionary inde-
terminists, such probabilities in evolutionary theory represent
irreducible indeterminism in the processes themselves.
Critics of evolutionary determinism have insisted that
drift is both real and an indispensable concept in evolution-
ary theory (Brandon and Carson 1996, Millstein 1996, 2002).
In response, evolutionary determinists point out that estab-
lishing the reality (or evolutionary significance) of drift is one
thing, but showing that drift entails a distinctive form of
evolutionary indeterminism is another matter entirely. They
maintain that the fundamental principle of evolutionary de-
terminism is operative here no less than in cases of natural se-
lection: Whether the events in question concern genes or
phenotypic characteristics, in all contexts outside of the pe-
culiar domain of quantum mechanics we are justified in as-
suming that identical causes result in identical effects. Given
the same genetic and developmental events, in the same en-
vironment, the same evolutionary effects will follow. If the evo-
lutionary indeterminist responds that this is more a restate-
ment of determinism than an independent argument for it,
the evolutionary determinist can reply that the burden of proof
lies with the evolutionary indeterminist to show why this
general principle, accepted by evolutionary indeterminists in
all contexts outside of quantum mechanics, fails to apply
with equal force to evolutionary processes.
Rather than make a direct appeal to principles, the evolu-
tionary determinist can also ask us to consider the nature of
drift as a causal process by considering a relatively simple ex-
ample. Suppose that a forest fire sweeps through an area,
killing 90 percent of a breeding population, and that survival
is unrelated to fitness differences. Presumably one could not,
before the fire struck, predict to a high degree of accuracy pre-
cisely which organisms would survive and which ones would
perish based on a knowledge of the particular traits of each
organism. Yet in retrospect the differential survivorship is
fully explainable in terms of a set of sufficient causes that re-
sulted in precisely that outcome. Some organisms survived be-
cause they were located near the periphery rather than near
the center of the fire and so were able to escape. Those able
to escape did so because their sensory organs interacted with
factors in the environment such that they identified the lo-
cation of the fire, engaged their locomotory apparatus, and
fled directly away from it. Others perished because their
brains misinterpreted the data from their sensory organs
and ran toward, rather than away from, the fire. The behav-
ior of each of these organisms could be specified further in
terms of individual neurobiological and physiological
processes. In each case the organism possessed some set of
physical properties that, in causal interaction with the envi-
ronment, resulted in differential biological success. At no
point is there any need to appeal to irreducibly indetermin-
istic processes. As Barbara Horan (1994) notes,“As far as we
know, the macroscopic environment faced by individual or-
ganisms is replete with deterministic processes, so all possi-
ble worlds that agree with this one in all respects relevant to
the origin, course, and extent of a natural disaster...that cre-
ates a founder population, will also agree on the subsequent
sample of breeding individuals....The same fire...in the same
conditions would create the same sample” (p. 84).“Drift” in
this view is simply a term referring to those evolutionary
processes resulting in differential biological success, the causes
of which we are ignorant (Rosenberg 1994); the indetermi-
nacy is entirely in our understanding of the processes rather
than in the processes themselves.
An experimental confirmation of evolutionary indetermin-
ism? A third argument for evolutionary indeterminism pro-
poses to dispense with thought experiments by treating the
issue as an empirical problem that can be settled by experi-
mental investigation. Brandon and Carson (1996) note that
“if [evolutionary] determinism is true...then identical or-
ganisms in identical environments should have identical evo-
lutionary fates” (p. 329). They offer an experimental test of
the evolutionary determinist thesis: Many organisms are
clonable, and clones may be placed in the same carefully
controlled environment, with the results recorded. When
this is done, the results are unequivocal. Despite the genetic
identity and identity of environmental conditions for the
plants grown by Bever (1994), there were significant differ-
ences among the phenotypes of the resulting plants. Brandon
and Carson take this as an empirical refutation of evolu-
tionary determinism and therefore as a vindication of evo-
lutionary indeterminism.
Predictably, evolutionary determinists find this argument
unconvincing. First, this example concerns development
rather than evolution. An argument for irreducible biologi-
cal indeterminism with regard to development will not sus-
tain the claim of irreducible evolutionary indeterminism.
Second, even if the connection between developmental in-
determinism and evolutionary indeterminism could be made,
in the experiments cited there is no way to control for inde-
terminism resulting from quantum-level effects, which are not
at issue in the debate over irreducible evolutionary indeter-
minism. Third, even if quantum-level effects could be ruled
out, it is impossible to eliminate all differences between the
plants and their respective environments, and thus it is always
possible that undetected differences (“hidden variables”) are
responsible for the phenotypic variance observed (Weber
2001). As chaos theory makes clear, there are limits to the pre-
cision of any measurement of initial conditions, and these lim-
its cannot, even in principle, be transcended. Initial conditions
can therefore vary even if we are unable to detect such dif-
ferences. Over time these small initial differences can be com-
pounded into huge, macroscopically significant effects. Chaos
Thinking of Biology
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theory gives determinism a new lease on life. Living things are
the most complex entities known. It is among living things,
most of all, that one would expect to see the effects of chaos
in action. An experimental refutation of evolutionary deter-
minism therefore seems doomed to failure.
The scientific realism argument. Evolutionary indetermin-
ists maintain that a commitment to scientific realism re-
quires accepting the idea that the probabilistic concepts ap-
pearing in evolutionary theory refer to irreducibly
indeterministic processes. Brandon and Carson (1996) point
out that in science the positing of theoretical entities is taken
seriously only when (a) positing such entities aids the devel-
opment of theory and (b) the available empirical evidence sup-
ports the assumption that such entities exist. But whereas “the
positing of genuinely probabilistic propensities governing
the evolutionary fates of individual organisms has been an in-
tegral part of the impressive development of evolutionary pop-
ulation genetic theories in this century.... the positing of de-
terministic hidden variables in evolutionary theory serves
no theoretical purpose at all” (Brandon and Carson 1996, p.
331). In addition, whereas all the evidence supports the idea
of probabilistic propensities, the notion of deterministic hid-
den variables in evolution is contradicted by the empirical data.
On both theoretical and empirical grounds, therefore, evo-
lutionary indeterminism should be accepted.
This argument is problematic for several reasons. First, the
relationship between scientific realism and evolutionary in-
determinism is far more complex than this argument suggests
(Weber 2001). Second, as Brandon and Carson admit, the ex-
perimental evidence they cite is perfectly consistent with a de-
terministic interpretation of evolution. It is therefore difficult
to see how the notion of deterministic hidden variables in evo-
lutionary theory is “contradicted by the empirical data.”
Third, it is far from clear that the positing of probabilistic
propensities has been as potent, and the positing of hidden
variables as impotent, in the history of evolutionary biology
as this argument asserts.What are considered hidden variables
at one stage of science (e.g., genes) may become manifest vari-
ables at some later stage. Finally, and most critically, this ar-
gument conflates evolutionary theory with the process of
evolution. Even if a given perspective is theoretically useful,
it does not follow that the entities postulated are real (con-
sider the ontological status of epicycles in Ptolemaic cos-
mology). As Alexander Rosenberg (1994) notes, “The ques-
tion of whether evolutionary phenomena are stochastic [i.e.,
indeterministic] is different from the question of whether our
best theory of these phenomena is unavoidably statistical [i.e.,
probabilistic]. Our best theory, present or future, may turn out
to be statistical because the deterministic facts about evolu-
tion are beyond our cognitive and computational powers to
apprehend in useful terms” (p. 59). Because both determin-
istic and indeterministic phenomena can be described prob-
abilistically, the fact that a theory is probabilistic is no guar-
antee that the processes it describes are indeterministic.
Hence, arguments that appeal to a realist conception of sci-
ence lend no support to the claim of evolutionary indeter-
minism.
The case for evolutionary determinism
Showing that arguments for a given view fail is insufficient to
establish the contrary view, because there may be insuffi-
cient reasons in support of either view. What positive argu-
ments can evolutionary determinists offer in support of their
view? Besides pointing out that the various arguments for evo-
lutionary indeterminism fail, evolutionary determinists main-
tain that only their view conforms with the understanding of
the world required by the physical sciences. This conviction
is encapsulated in the “unity of the sciences” argument.
The unity of the sciences argument: According to our best
physical theories, all macrolevel physical processes are
(apart from any indeterministic effects percolating up from
the quantum level) entirely deterministic. Evolutionary
processes such as selection, drift, and migration are all
macro-level physical processes. Therefore, evolutionary
processes are (apart from any indeterministic effects perco-
lating up from the quantum level) entirely deterministic.
The unity of the sciences argument is predicated on what could
be called “ontological/process reductionism”: the principle that
biological systems are composed entirely of entities of the sort
studied by chemistry and physics, and that biological processes
consist entirely of chemical and physical microprocesses.
Any indeterminism associated with biological properties
would have to be explicable in terms of properties at a sub-
biological level. But our best understanding of the physical
structure of the world provides no reason to suppose that there
are sources of indeterminism in physical systems in addition
to those associated with quantum phenomena. Were the
claims of evolutionary indeterminism true, a fundamental re-
vision in our understanding of the physical world would be
required on a par with that which accompanied quantum me-
chanics a century ago. Evolutionary determinists remain un-
convinced that adequate motivation exists for any such dras-
tic revision of worldview. In the absence of such motivation,
evolutionary determinism should be embraced.
Despite its apparent simplicity, this argument for evolu-
tionary determinism faces problems of its own. On the one
hand, it emphasizes that our understanding of evolution
should accord with our understanding of the purely physi-
cal domain. If the purely physical domain is deterministic, then
so too is the biological domain.Yet our understanding of the
physical domain does not come to us in unfiltered form di-
rectly from nature itself. It is mediated by our best scientific
theories: that is, the theories that have proved most theoret-
ically fruitful and empirically adequate. Those theories tell us
that (apart from any quantum-level effects) the physical
world is fully deterministic. But if so, then the evolutionary
indeterminist can point out that ultimately the evolutionary
determinist is putting faith in the referential success of our best
scientific theories in a given domain to tell us what the phe-
nomena in that domain are really like. This is, of course, pre-
cisely what the evolutionary indeterminist proposes to do with
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regard to our best theories of evolutionary phenomena. The
dilemma: The evolutionary determinist cannot invest faith in
the referential accuracy of our best physical theories while re-
jecting appeals to the referential accuracy of our best biolog-
ical theories—unless, that is, scientific knowledge in one do-
main (physics) is to be privileged over that in another
(biology). Doing so, however, is likely to encounter intense re-
sistance among those who have labored long and hard to ar-
gue that, whereas biology is indeed distinct from physics in
fundamental respects, it is no less scientific and no less re-
vealing of the nature of the world (Mayr 1982, 1988).
The evolutionary indeterminism 
debate and the nature of biology
As David Stamos (2001) speculates, although the debate be-
tween evolutionary indeterminists and evolutionary deter-
minists appears to be about the nature of evolutionary
processes, at a deeper level the disagreement concerns the more
fundamental issue of the relationship between biology and the
physical sciences. Evolutionary indeterminists argue that the
success of evolutionary theory warrants the claim that the
probabilities it uses are objective features of the processes it
describes, even if this requires positing indeterminacies that
have no explanation in chemistry or physics. Evolutionary in-
determinists do not consider this problematic, because evo-
lutionary theory (and biology more generally) already deploys
concepts that transcend explication in purely physical terms
(e.g., competition, camouflage, mimicry, and sexual selection).
Methodologically and conceptually, biology enjoys consid-
erable autonomy from the physical sciences.
Evolutionary determinists, on the other hand, argue that,
although biology can and must make use of concepts that have
no direct analogue in the physical sciences, nonetheless the
processes described by these concepts must all, at the end of
the day, be explicable in purely physical terms. Evolutionary
determinists uphold consilience within and among the find-
ings of various branches of science as a fundamental re-
quirement for a unified scientific conception of the universe.
In support of this value, they can appeal to the example of Dar-
win, who took the idea of consilience very seriously, as he was
convinced (and attempted to convince others) that the broad
range of facts drawn from widely different sciences (e.g.,
geology, embryology, and biogeography) made sense only
in light of his theory. In addition, evolutionary determinists
can point out that Darwin was genuinely worried that esti-
mates of the age of Earth provided by the physical sciences of
his day provided insufficient time for the slow march of evo-
lution to have reached its present state, a worry that would
make sense only if he believed that ultimately the physical and
biological sciences revealed a single interconnected but im-
mensely complex world.
Alas, evolutionary indeterminists can appeal to Darwin as
well, noting that he did not retract his theory in light of the
apparently conflicting data coming from the physical sci-
ences, but instead maintained confidence that, so great was
the explanatory power of the concepts deployed in his theory,
a rapprochement between the physical and biological sci-
ences would eventually be forthcoming. Darwin’s confidence
in the explanatory power of his theory, as it turned out, was
fully justified. Neither philosophical arguments nor appeals
to Darwin’s historical example are at present sufficient to re-
solve the debate over evolutionary indeterminism. Yet the
issues at stake in this debate raise fundamental questions
concerning our understanding of both science and the nature
of the world it attempts to explain, and thus are worthy of con-
tinued critical reflection.
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